J. Tattersall wrote:might indicate things aren't going according to plan.
I only know of rumblings by framework nations that as the use of the 'tool' has not been as envisaged, perhaps they will rather direct more of those funds to their national defence (it's the same manpower, but perhaps material acquisitions have been skewed towards less relevant items). Some items that need streamlining for the Union's rapid reaction and stabilisation instrument are
- it is widely considered that the situation in Mali is a missed opportunity for the first use of EU battlegroups; instead France is negotiating bilaterally contributions to the Tabuka TF (which is a 'burden-sharing instrument' and as a coalition of the willing, draws directly from national militaries)
- the view that the reviewed ATHENA mechanism for common costs of military operations
still does not take adequately into account the specificities of the battlegroup concept
- calls for a significant expansion of the common costs for rapid reaction operations, up to a full coverage of costs when battlegroups are used
- applying the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle to the battlegroups, put on stand-by on a voluntary and rotational basis, is contrary to the principle of fair burden-sharing (so this is more widely the same point as framework nations taking on a disproportionate share of the costs. Cfr. the previous point about the
actual use of BGs)
- more interoperability is needed, not only at technical level but also at procedural and conceptual levels, in particular to align rules of engagement and transfer of authority and to remove national caveats. This discussion would not be had, had the appetite for NATO out-of-area operations not diminished to a remarkable degree
- possible simplified procedures regarding deployments of battlegroups for limited periods of time, provided that certain, clearly defined and agreed preconditions are met, such as a specific request from the United Nations. Addresses the point that UN operations are often a motley collection of light infantry units, arriving piecemeal over an extended period and any commander might find him/her
self in a situation, where there is no mobile reserve to hand, capable of relieving a component force that has got into real trouble. Past examples abound as often there is a need to cover an extensive area (thinly)
- with all of the above, encourage recurring commitments in order to avoid gaps in the battlegroup roster
- see battlegroup 'groupings' as longer-term partnerships lasting beyond the stand-by period to drive joint procurement of equipment and services and of pooling and sharing
- especially putting backin-up logistic services for EU battlegroup(s) on stand-by onto a more standing basis (contractually, if not in physical terms)
- regardless of what costs could/should be charged to the EU budget, it must not be forgotten that the battlegroups provide a specific instrument of a limited size and sustainability that is adapted to a certain number of scenarios and cannot be considered either a EU military nor a universal crisis management tool
... one could recall (but most wouldn't like to
) that the initial Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999, reconfirmed by the European Council in 2008, set the objective for the EU to be capable of deploying 60 000 men in 60 days for a major operation. The Franco-British joint intervention force could be seen as a reaction (out of frustration) to nothing much happening in this respect, and even then it has taken ten years and the goal has been scaled back from 55k force to a max. 30k (all-arms, not boots on the ground. More like elements from two brigades) force.
Other than that
it is all easy and straight-forward
Ever-lasting truths: Multi-year budgets/ planning by necessity have to address the painful questions; more often than not the Either-Or prevails over Both-And.
If everyone is thinking the same, then someone is not thinking (attributed to Patton)