Current & Future Escorts - General Discussion

[Poiuytrewq]

The T32 design and role has been left vague, it will be discussed politically for years, but most likely will be the next GP T31 replacement.

The T31s won’t need replaced until the mid 2040s at the earliest.

That’s a lot of talking.

[Poiuytrewq]

When assaulting against a nation-level militia (which can do UAV/USV-drone swarm attack), RN shall simply add a full-set of CVTF to LSG. This is my point. "Do not think small of your enemy".

Completely agree but adding the CSG every time the LSG is formed totally shreds the LRG/LSG/ESF concept. What is the point of having a forward based high readiness force if you have to wait for the full CSG to use it? Why not just dispatch the entire ESF from the UK at the same time? It would be vastly cheaper.

For the concept to work RN needs to find a cost effective way to operate and safeguard the LRG/LSG force both on and offshore without using F35s or T26s.

It can be done and it must be done or the plan won’t make it from concept to reality.

I think T32 will not come, at least not in a decade. No money, no man-power. Just it.

Perhaps but RN is adamant the T32s are required for the FCF.

I am more interested in how RN intend to use it.

The MRSS format (minimal aviation, 2 LCU capacity) makes much more sense if they are to act as lilipads between the T32s and the CSG at around 20nm to 40nm from the shore. As said that would allow the T32s to be the Littoral enablers with the CVF providing the bulk of the aviation at distance.

Personally I think the T32, MRSS and CSG structure is suboptimal and certainly not the cheapest option but at least it is coherent.

[donald_of_tokyo]

When assaulting against a nation-level militia (which can do UAV/USV-drone swarm attack), RN shall simply add a full-set of CVTF to LSG. This is my point. "Do not think small of your enemy".

Completely agree but adding the CSG every time the LSG is formed totally shreds the LRG/LSG/ESF concept. What is the point of having a forward based high readiness force if you have to wait for the full CSG to use it? Why not just dispatch the entire ESF from the UK at the same time? It would be vastly cheaper.

Simple. Not many militia nor nation can do drone swarm against UK. So, LRG without CVTF has many places to work.

Hoiti rebels are the top-ranked militia. It is much more powerful than over 80% of the nations world-wide, and 99% of the militia world-wide.

It is in these low-threat environment RM works well. Small militia may have drones. May do drones attack. But, even a single T31 can handle most of it, if the number of drones reaching UK ships are less than a few dozens. Of course, if UK failed to identify the threat, it is UK MI-5's failure. Intelligence is the top priority in any kind of amphibious operations. UK must neutralize 90% of such enemy assets before any assault starts (how about simple GPS jamming? Anti-jam GPS? Must be very expensive). If there is not enough information and soft-kill countermeasure, just stop and wait.

Amphibious operation in blind is something you must never do. Blackhawk down.

[donald_of_tokyo]

I am not saying T32 or MRSS concept is unimportant. Just, saying "RM operations cannot be done without them" is not true. T32 is a good addition, but still just an "addition", not essential, at least to my mind.

[Repulse]

The T32 design and role has been left vague, it will be discussed politically for years, but most likely will be the next GP T31 replacement.

The T31s won’t need replaced until the mid 2040s at the earliest.

That’s a lot of talking.

Yep, but not out of the question. The last T23 was commissioned in 2002, first T31 will be commissioned in 2027.

Potentially some MH LSVs, OPV replacements and maybe even an export or two in the meantime.

[Repulse]

Completely agree but adding the CSG every time the LSG is formed totally shreds the LRG/LSG/ESF concept. What is the point of having a forward based high readiness force if you have to wait for the full CSG to use it? Why not just dispatch the entire ESF from the UK at the same time? It would be vastly cheaper.

With the exception of SF raids forward based high readiness LRGs make no strategic sense unless part of a larger multi-national force. That is why I think basing a Bay and a RM company on rotation in Australia to integrate with the RAN amphibious force makes the most sense.

If money would allow I’d like a globally roaming Argus replacement, but the rest needs to be UK based capable of deploying as part of a LSG as required.

Perhaps but RN is adamant the T32s are required for the FCF.

I wonder what the RN would chose when the inevitable choice between T32s or more SSNs comes - I think it’s clear.

This is why again the real discussion should be about the MH LSVs and OPV replacements.

[Poiuytrewq]

I am not saying T32 or MRSS concept is unimportant. Just, saying "RM operations cannot be done without them" is not true. T32 is a good addition, but still just an "addition", not essential, at least to my mind.

I am not suggesting a new fleet needs to be created for the FCF, just trying to make sense of the entire LSG/LRG concept. Currently I think the concept is so overly ambitious I don’t think it will happen on the near future unless it is on a tiny scale. The Amphibious vessels available are inefficient to make it work and the manpower simply isn’t there to do it properly.

Everything changes however if both Albions are put into extended readiness and the RB1s are decommissioned without replacement around 2025/2026, comfortably after the next GE.

RN could then gradually man the T31s and T32s as they are commissioned and the six MRSS would be RFA vessels with RM attached from 2032 onwards.

I’m not suggesting this direction of travel but the numbers are remarkably close to make it work.

[Repulse]

Perhaps the wrong thread, but I think that six MRSS would be a mistake. It is based on the principle that six large ships would give flexibility to scale, which is true to a point but actually the FCF needs are more complex and there are better solutions than a one common platform fits all approach.

For example, an “Airborne” Littoral Strike Group (ALSG) consisting of a CVF sailing with a LPD and a FSS can arguably support a Cdo sized helicopter assault OTH, along with the ability to resupply using LCMs restocked from the support ship. Therefore, keeping two large LPDs with large flight decks is a key capability - MRSS flight decks are relatively small and there is no need for a hangar.

As an aside two ALSG, each with 4 escorts, would require a total of 14 escorts based on the 25% losses + 33% maintenance formula discussed earlier.

Add an Aviation Support Ship capable of operating six helicopters and 200 troops then adds the ability to doing large SF airborne raids. It could do this by itself when operating in low threat maritime environments, but if could also be added to a ALSG or part of an allied force. In fact this is what I would base in Australia to operate independently and alongside the RAN amphibious force.

What is left is the requirement to land sub company sized units directly to shore and able to support them by operating further inshore in the Littorals. This is where the T32 becomes interesting, but with the need for multiple vessels then I think the term Frigate is overdoing it.

[Poiuytrewq]

Not much new here but still an ongoing commitment from HMG to the T32 programme as well increasing overall Frigate and Destroyer numbers.

[donald_of_tokyo]

Thanks.

20. The decision to select Team Resolute bid as the preferred bidder for the upcoming order of Fleet Solid Support ships could create a potential gap in the workstream for the Scottish warship industry. (Paragraph 62)

20: The MOD does not agree that the decision to award the Fleet Solid Support contract to Team Resolute creates a potential gap in the workstream for the Scottish warship industry. Construction of the Fleet Solid Support ships will begin in 2025 with all three ships entering service by 2032. Construction of the Type 31 frigates will continue until 2028 with the final ship entering service in 2030, while construction of the Type 26 frigates is expected to continue into the mid-2030s. To have delayed the build of the Fleet Solid Support ships until after the completion of either Type 26 or Type 31 would have placed at risk the vital capability provided by the Fleet Solid Support ships in support of Carrier Strike.

MOD does NOT answer the question. There is a clear gap of order to Rosyth after 2028.

Up to here, just fact.

From here, just my thought.

And, if T32 build to start around 2028 (highly un-likely), there is a big gap from 2032 onwards. None of this is answered. If T32 order be delayed, yes there is a gap after 2028. In short, in both cases, of course, there is a clear gap there.

MOD is just honest, and saying "they are not thinking anything after T31 on Rosyth". On the other hand, T83 is considered after T26 for Clyde, they sates so.

[SD67]

Thanks.

20. The decision to select Team Resolute bid as the preferred bidder for the upcoming order of Fleet Solid Support ships could create a potential gap in the workstream for the Scottish warship industry. (Paragraph 62)

20: The MOD does not agree that the decision to award the Fleet Solid Support contract to Team Resolute creates a potential gap in the workstream for the Scottish warship industry. Construction of the Fleet Solid Support ships will begin in 2025 with all three ships entering service by 2032. Construction of the Type 31 frigates will continue until 2028 with the final ship entering service in 2030, while construction of the Type 26 frigates is expected to continue into the mid-2030s. To have delayed the build of the Fleet Solid Support ships until after the completion of either Type 26 or Type 31 would have placed at risk the vital capability provided by the Fleet Solid Support ships in support of Carrier Strike.

MOD does NOT answer the question. There is a clear gap of order to Rosyth after 2028.

Up to here, just fact.

From here, just my thought.

And, if T32 build to start around 2028 (highly un-likely), there is a big gap from 2032 onwards. None of this is answered. If T32 order be delayed, yes there is a gap after 2028. In short, in both cases, of course, there is a clear gap there.

MOD is just honest, and saying "they are not thinking anything after T31 on Rosyth". On the other hand, T83 is considered after T26 for Clyde, they sates so.

I think they answered it- if FSS went to Rosyth it could not start until 2029 so there would be a critical capability gap for the RN until the mid 2030s. The carriers would become almost undeployable.

Something will be found to fill the gap at Rosyth. OPVs, a frigate for Ukraine or NZ, maybe a couple of blocks for Poland

[tomuk]

Or just some T31 Batch 2s which is what T32 really is. Despite BAE muddying the water with it's concept.

[donald_of_tokyo]

...I think they answered it- if FSS went to Rosyth it could not start until 2029 so there would be a critical capability gap for the RN until the mid 2030s. The carriers would become almost undeployable.

Sorry, disagree. The "gap" of the original question is on the Scottich shipbuilding industry", not on "RN capability". I think MOD intentionally swapped the word. I think this is dishonest.

Something will be found to fill the gap at Rosyth. OPVs, a frigate for Ukraine or NZ, maybe a couple of blocks for Poland

This is what MOD must have been answered.
- T32 future is not yet clear. At least, no resources has been allocated. National Ship Building Office (NSBO) must push HMG to locate resource to RN for T32
- RN will try to prepare an alternative shipbuilding plan, such as newly built LSVs for MHC block2. As RN need additional resource to do this, compared to buying used vessels off the shelf. NSBO must push HMG to allocate this resource.
- RN will try to prepare yet another alternative shipbuilding plan, such as newly built MROSS2 from Rosyth. LSVs for MHC block2. As RN need additional resource to do this, compared to buying used vessels off the shelf. NSBO must push HMG to allocate this resource.
- In case this two plans were not available, NSBO must arrange alternative ship building plan to fill the highly possible gap in Rosyth shipyard after 2028. This will include Scottish government to order some of their replacement ferries to Rosyth.

Avoiding gap in ship building DOES put some restriction to RN, this is unavoidable. Typical is the French navies "losing" the FREMM Normandie, by selling her to Egypt right from the production line, and add her replacement at the bottom. Another typical example was River B2 OPVs ordered in place of T26 program delay. Now River B2 is well integrated into RN operation, but originally they were planned just to replace the 4 River B1 OPVs as their early replacements.

[SD67]

Yeah but the point is the need to get the FSS in the water trumps everything. RFA Fort Victoria is 30 years old, now. Failure to replace at the earliest opportunity with the lowest risk design will mean, worst case, crippling the UK's 10 billion plus investment in Carrier strike.

Compared to that potential disaster, the task of finding work for Rosyth in 4 years time is trivial.

IMHO you could turn the question around by offering the SNP the use of Rosyth to rebuild their CALMAC ferry fleet and / or Fishery Protection Vessels, instead of going to Turkey - but the MOD are too polite unfortunately

[Poiuytrewq]

Very interesting thought provoking piece.

I don’t agree with all of the conclusions of the piece but with Sweden and Finland joining NATO everything including JEF and the deployable division commitment needs complete reassessment.

The implications for RN from such a maritime tilt would be vast.

[Tempest414]

Yeah but the point is the need to get the FSS in the water trumps everything. RFA Fort Victoria is 30 years old, now. Failure to replace at the earliest opportunity with the lowest risk design will mean, worst case, crippling the UK's 10 billion plus investment in Carrier strike.

Compared to that potential disaster, the task of finding work for Rosyth in 4 years time is trivial.

IMHO you could turn the question around by offering the SNP the use of Rosyth to rebuild their CALMAC ferry fleet and / or Fishery Protection Vessels, instead of going to Turkey - but the MOD are too polite unfortunately

I agree if the SNP is so concerned about a ship building gap in Scottish yards they could request that Rosyth build 4 fishery OPV's

[wargame_insomniac]

Very interesting thought provoking piece.

I don’t agree with all of the conclusions of the piece but with Sweden and Finland joining NATO everything including JEF and the deployable division commitment needs complete reassessment.

The implications for RN from such a maritime tilt would be vast.

It’s an argument that has made many times, but alas there are still illusions to want to be a full spectrum Tier 1 military power.

What does resonate with me is the following:

As Adm. Sir Tony Radakin, the Chief of the Defence Staff, has explained, the tenets of the traditional British way of warfare are an orientation to expeditionary rather than continental power, gaining advantage through the indirect application of force, with and through allies and partners, and not from mass but through disproportionate effect.

We are not and cannot afford to be a continental land power. Once the obsession of BOAR v2 and wanting to be a mini USA dies, the UK can focus on things that matter.

I’ve often wondered if the UK needs a Purple version of the USMC focused solely on expeditionary power projection that would include the Army, RAF and RNs elements joined into a coherent structure. It would also allow more sensible conversations to be had about requirements and priorities. For example, who cares if the F35Bs are owned by the RAF if they are embedded with the carriers and can be relied to be there when needed.

Combining this with a similar Global Presence and Territorial Defence structures would give clarity of strategy, purpose and direction that seems lacking.

[Ron5]

I’ve often wondered if the UK needs a Purple version of the USMC focused solely on expeditionary power projection that would include the Army, RAF and RNs elements joined into a coherent structure.

You mean like when the Navy owned its aircraft and marines? Not that long ago. I agree 100% it should be reinstated asap.

[wargame_insomniac]

I’ve often wondered if the UK needs a Purple version of the USMC focused solely on expeditionary power projection that would include the Army, RAF and RNs elements joined into a coherent structure.

You mean like when the Navy owned its aircraft and marines? Not that long ago. I agree 100% it should be reinstated asap.

My word! I think I agree with something Ron is saying - I might have to see the doctor, in case I have unknown fever symptoms!!

[Repulse]

I’ve often wondered if the UK needs a Purple version of the USMC focused solely on expeditionary power projection that would include the Army, RAF and RNs elements joined into a coherent structure.

You mean like when the Navy owned its aircraft and marines? Not that long ago. I agree 100% it should be reinstated asap.

Not quite

I’m more focused on getting the right overall outcome than the colour of the uniforms. The current situation just continues to allow cross service rivalry to hide the lack of a coherent strategy.

A clear strategy in terms of expeditionary ambition, low level peacetime global presence and an integrated territorial defence outside of the current service centric plans, is a key step towards getting better value for money, and what’s more the capabilities needed.

[Dobbo]

I agree with this.

If the mid to long term defence and economic strategy is to: (1) grow the economy faster; (2) increase defence spending to 3% of GDP; and (3) focus that increased spending on naval and air capability, that is a high level coherent strategy (if all are executed efficiently).

I don’t think the U.K. should be a “land power” with a large standing army - we need a certain size to field support for allies and protect our own interests, but the main capability of being able to make an adversary’s position untenable by destroying their air, naval (and then) ground forces in situ is really what the armed forces of the 2030s should be capable of doing.

[Repulse]

Thinking about “low level peacetime global presence” some more, perhaps this should really be coined “Diplomacy and Grey Zone conflict response”.

[SD67]

I'm assuming/guessing that a bit of low key grey zone recon was the "side hustle" of the OPV Global Goodwill tour that's been going on for the last couple of years and that pair of ISO containers on the River class are not just storing crates of beer and deckchairs

[SW1]

It reads like the equivalent of a SNP election broadcast for the Navy party only instead of the independence wolf whistle it’s we are an island more ship more ships with some fluff round the edges.

It’s poorly argued imo and if we were to concentrate on underwater threats and trade routes the navy wouldn’t look anything like it currently does.

Too many shape their view around their favourite equipment purchase and don’t really look to prioritise and define what needs to be done to achieve it.

If you wanted a government high level strategy it could be rule of law, national resilience and free trade. I doubt anyone in the activist media, ruling elite or most commentators would allow what would need to be done to achieve it to happen though.

[Ron5]

And some shape their view around their least favored equipment.