What should a balanced UK armed forces look like?

[marktigger]

there has been a few discussions on the forum about strengths and weakness of the UK armed forces. I would suggest they are now at critical mass and very out of balance to cover the spectrum of missions they have undertook since the coming down of the Berlin wall. Any of which they are likely to have to repeat.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Full spectrum is an interesting phrase, and often used.

Full spectrum as in broad and flexible capabilities?

Or full spectrum as in being a valued and capable ally in going head to head with a peer or near-peer opponent?

[marktigger]

i would suggest being able to do low to medium level operations independently but as a capable ally in a high intensity operaion

[Pseudo]

I've tended to think that as far as the UK is concerned a strategically balanced force would have a naval bias with the army being the lowest priority. Having said that, I think that the army's close to as small as is feasible (if not already too small) as it is.

[marktigger]

the Army and the Navy are as small as they should be. But then I head commentators in the 90's before the Wall came down saying they were both to small!

[WhitestElephant]

we should see spending re-balance to a more natural position, with the RAF and RN seeing some gains and the army some losses (reduction to 82,000 regular soldiers anyone?).

I still think the British Army is too big. Cut another 20,000, be ruthless with cap badges and bring commonality to the vehicle fleets. Huge savings to be made there... reinvest it all in the Royal Navy.

[Engaging Strategy]

Marktigger- Yes uk steel has not so much risen in price, what has happened is World Energy prices have fallen. But here in the uk since the price of oil and gas came tumbling down our energy prices are still at a high level. Consequently whilst other countries have lowered the price of steel we haven't. Plus you also need to have a domestic demand for steel of a certain quality.

What happened was China created massive production overcapacity to artificially boost their GDP figures, flooded the market with cheap steel and screwed everyone (including themselves). In terms of FLF i'm of the opinion that UK steel should be used, the current glut of steel will pass and prices will rise eventually. It's just a matter of ordering enough from UK mills to enable them to ride out the storm.

I still think the British Army is too big. Cut another 20,000, be ruthless with cap badges and bring commonality to the vehicle fleets. Huge savings to be made there... reinvest it all in the Royal Navy.

I'm not so sure about that deep a cut, I think we're about right with where we are manpower-wise at the moment but we're using what we've got inefficiently. Too many well understrength infantry cap badges being held onto and tying up precious manpower and too few support troops, especially signals and logistics. If you wanted to get really radical I'd say turn the heavy brigades into 25% regular 75% reserve formations with a small contingent ready at short notice. Completely agree that we need to ruthlessly pursue commonality. In an ideal world I'd also turn one of the Army's light infantry brigades over to the Royal Marines as a dedicated follow-on amphibious force. I would suggest a similar idea for 16AA Bde but I fear that a lack of wokkas would be an issue on that front.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

^^ I know there is a pretty hefty Navy bias here on UKDF but 'f*** no!' to the above...

[RetroSicotte]

I'm with UJ on that one. That would be devastating for the forces as a whole. That much of a cut would result in the Royal Marines needing to absorb extra funding to carry out the same tasks that just got lost thus meaning the whole exercise would be pointless anyway.

[marktigger]

there is a discussion about forces balance in another thread the last couple of posts could be moved to

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

I'm with UJ on that one. That would be devastating for the forces as a whole. That much of a cut would result in the Royal Marines needing to absorb extra funding to carry out the same tasks that just got lost thus meaning the whole exercise would be pointless anyway.

RS, the voice as sanity as ever

'The British Army is a projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy'. They are two parts of the one equation - without one another they are nothing and neither is the UK.

Plus, petty inter-service squabbling between the branches is partly the reason why we are in the predicament we find ourselves with in the first place. We're all on the same side here (Navy advocates, Army advocates, RAF advocates).

[Engaging Strategy]

there is a discussion about forces balance in another thread the last couple of posts could be moved to

Agreed.

'The British Army is a projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy'. They are two parts of the one equation - without one another they are nothing and neither is the UK.

Plus, petty inter-service squabbling between the branches is partly the reason why we are in the predicament we find ourselves with in the first place.

This is very true, time to restore some balance to the equation now the sandpit's over and done with.

We're all on the same side here (Navy advocates, Army advocates, RAF advocates).

Don't get too carried away the RAF are, of course, the deadliest threat that has faced the UK since Napoleon decided he rather liked the idea of a stroll down Picadilly high street!

[WhitestElephant]

I've tended to think that as far as the UK is concerned a strategically balanced force would have a naval bias with the army being the lowest priority. Having said that, I think that the army's close to as small as is feasible (if not already too small) as it is.

I agree, a balanced force for the UK would be one where we play to our strength, and that has always been the ocean.

Armies can be built relatively quickly and cheaply, while the RAF and Royal Navy cannot.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

I've tended to think that as far as the UK is concerned a strategically balanced force would have a naval bias with the army being the lowest priority. Having said that, I think that the army's close to as small as is feasible (if not already too small) as it is.

I agree, a balanced force for the UK would be one where we play to our strength, and that has always been the ocean.

Armies can be built relatively quickly and cheaply, while the RAF and Royal Navy cannot.

The BEF (both of them in fact) would have a bone to pick with you on that one.

[shark bait]

Carrying on from the other thread,

I think the army is at about the right strength now, that is plenty to react for early intervention tasks. As @WhitestElephant said they seriously need to get their shit together and fix the messy UOR vehicle fleet to benefit from some serious commonality efficiencies.

The RAF and Royal navy in particular at a critical mass, still capable of sustained global intervention, but any less and it would fall apart. The modest increases in the latest SDSR are very welcome, and should be followed by more modest increases at the next SDSR. They need to be built up to enable the army to react rapidly, and to maintain our global presence. The current swing away from 'boots on the ground' thrusts the RAF and navy onto centre stage as we are seeing at the moment.

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

Carrying on from the other thread,

I think the army is at about the right strength now, that is plenty to react for early intervention tasks. As @WhitestElephant said they seriously need to get their shit together and fix the messy UOR vehicle fleet to benefit from some serious commonality efficiencies.

The RAF and Royal navy in particular at a critical mass, still capable of sustained global intervention, but any less and it would fall apart. The modest increases in the latest SDSR are very welcome, and should be followed by more modest increases at the next SDSR. They need to be built up to enable the army to react rapidly, and to maintain our global presence. The current swing away from 'boots on the ground' thrusts the RAF and navy onto centre stage as we are seeing at the moment.

I don't think we can say that at present. Time will decide that so we are unlikely to know for some years yet - all depends on the implementation of Army 2020/JF2025. There are certain theories behind the reduction that hold water (a smaller more deployable medium weight force being more capable/offering more power projection than its cold war counterpart for example) but they need to be made to work, otherwise they simply constitute wishful thinking.

[arfah]

-<>-<>-<>-

[~UNiOnJaCk~]

^ Hear, hear!

And not to mention that the British Army in particular seems to dedicate even more effort to high quality training than many of its NATO counterparts do (i think basic training is the longest in NATO? Perhaps you could confirm or deny that, Arfah?). Building something like the British Army therefore takes even longer still!

[shark bait]

it may be reasonably quick to train up an infantry unit, but to get a well trained, high quality, effective army does take a long time. That's not something any country can get off the shelf.

Arfah put it well, all sides of the armed forces need to be strong.

I think there has been some bias to supporting the land element of our armed forces over the past decade+, and quite rightly so, if we're involved in a major land campaign we should expect the man on the ground to be as well trained, well equipped and well supported as possible.

Now we are no longer involved in that campaign I think it is reasonable to rebalance that triangle, and dedicate more resources into the RAF an RN.

Does any one have figures for how the money is actually split between the forces?

[Pseudo]

Since Trident means that any conflict our army is involved in will almost certainly be expeditionary, I wonder what is the largest unilateral expeditionary deployment that we might reasonably expect that we would embark upon. I also notice the emphasis made in this thread of the high quality of our army, which makes me wonder whether our ability to contribute such high quality to multilateral operations might make up for quantity.

[shark bait]

@Pseudo, I think it does. Everything in Britain needs to be quality over quantity.

We cannot compete so well on scale, but we absolutely can compete on quality. I would always favour a smaller more credible armed forces, which is why a 2 tier navy with a light frigate, or 2 tier RAF with a Textron scorpion has never sat well with me. Any major campaign we get into will likely involve the Americans, and/or NATO. Let them supply the mass, we can supply the quality. (For that reason, I think it is important our army is structured to work well with the Americans.)

Quality over quantity is something I come across all the time in engineering. We will never match the quantity of iPhones china pumps out, but we sure can beat them on the quality of the cars we produce. We will do much better ensuring we keep that quality edge, rather than trying to match on quantity. I think the same is applicable to our armed forces.

[ArmChairCivvy]

Does any one have figures for how the money is actually split between the forces?

For the last two budget years it looks like this (what can be allocated from the either side of £37 bn total):


Outturn by Top Level Budget (reviewed as forecast against budget by the Board during the year)
Royal Navy 2,347,969 2,270,922 UP
Army 6,365,814 6,740,905 DOWN
Royal Air Force 2,411,278 2,541,985 DOWN
Joint Forces Command 1,876,347 1,523,486 UP, BUT THIS INCLUDES SCOPE CHANGES
Defence Equipment & Support 8,343,573 8,258,402 UP, NOT MUCH
Defence Infrastructure Organisation 2,749,397 2,771,562
Head Office & Corporate Services 1,476,437 1,414,884
25,570,815 25,522,146 (YEAR'S TOTAL, REMARKABLY UNCHANGED!)

[ArmChairCivvy]

What you could consider capital+inventory is dominated by items that just run and run (yearly £9.9bn).

Out of a lesser total, that can be looked at, the majority is run by DE&S to approved plans; only this much
out of the yearly total of of £7.8 bn are new decisions (in the margin, '000 of £):

Royal Navy 13,818 2,413 UP
Army 36,500 39,693 DOWN
Royal Air Force 4,893 1,375 UP
Joint Forces Command 7,028 10,502
Defence Infrastructure Organisation 731,573 817,716
Head Office & Corporate Services (221,265) 28,199 HEFTY DOWN

Total Capital Outturn 7,836,281 7,443,256

THEN, WHEN YOU PUT THE KIT MAINTENANCE AND UPGRADES TOGETHER WITH OLD PLANS AND NEW ADDITIONS, YOU WILL COME TO THE PUNCH LINE (EQUIPMENT ONLY):

Equipment Plan 2014-15
£000
Outturn by Budget Area
Strategic Programme 3,864,800 (ehemm, no prizes for guessing what this is)
DE&S Corporate 42,200 (investing in their own capacity)
Joint Forces Command 2,207,400 (they just got all of the IT, thanks!)
Royal Air Force 3,373,900 ( a delicate equilibrium between the RAF and RN has developed)
Royal Navy 3,373,300 (... or just a pure coincidence?)
Army 1,608,700 (no wonder anything new, beyond replacements, will only come on stream in mid '20s)

Total 14,470,300 (so this is double of the spend on new kit, most countries would have it separate, but in the modern age, how do you evaluate upgrading vs scrap & get new if you have different budget holders?)

[Pseudo]

I once again ask, what's the largest likely amount of manpower the army will have to unilaterally deploy?

[shark bait]

I once again ask, what's the largest likely amount of manpower the army will have to unilaterally deploy?

from the SDSR;

"An Army Division of three brigades and supporting functions of between 30,000 to 40,000 personnel"