Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Contains threads on Royal Navy equipment of the past, present and future.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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jedibeeftrix wrote: 12 May 2023, 12:56
SW1 wrote: 12 May 2023, 11:20
jedibeeftrix wrote: 12 May 2023, 09:19 The JEF/Nato vs Aukus/IndoPac resourcing conundrum seems like one that should be defined as commited-forces vs contingency-forces.

Units can have both a committed and a contingency role.
e.g. an RB2 committed to Oman, but available as a continecy resource to deploy into the pacific.
e.g. the gurkas committed to brunei, but available as a continecy elsewhere

You don't want to create the classic post-coldwar sleight-of-hand by committing forces to multiple tasks.
e.g. thinking of the franco-german brigade in the early noughties.

3Cdo is primarily a contingency force, that is more or less their main selling point:
Yes, (small) elements might be committed to JEF, but if there isn't thre ability to form a RM battlegroup RM force for a contingency then I personally consider it to be poorly employed. Offering a poor return on investment.
This includes the possibility that a battlegroup can't be formed without breaking political commitments to JEF/NATO by removing committed forces to resource the contingency need.

So, yes, I tend to agree that JEF will be our primary focus for committed forces within Nato, but it is far more appropriate for an Army brigade to be the resource used for that commitment.
And, yes, I tend to agree that Technology/Intel will be our primary commitment within Aukus, but it is still appropriate to earmark 3Cdo (battlegroup) as a resource for IndoPac contingency.
As quoted by the RN

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-l ... e-maritime

The Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime) is the Royal Navy’s high-readiness global task force. Together with armed forces from eight other nations, the unit is poised to respond to crises whenever and wherever they unfold.

Launched at NATO’s Wales summit in 2014, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a UK-led task group consisting of armed forces from the UK and eight partner nations: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

Britain’s contribution to the JEF includes personnel and equipment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force, with the maritime element headed up by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.

The task group is designed to demonstrate the UK’s ability to project a highly effective maritime task force anywhere in the world, both individually and in partnership with other allied nations.
Re: "Britain’s contribution to the JEF includes personnel and equipment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force, with the maritime element headed up by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines."

What RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Is it a full Carrier/Amphibious taskgroup, or, is it closer to what I described above:
e.g. an RB2 committed to Oman, but available as a continecy resource to deploy into the pacific.
e.g. the gurkas committed to brunei, but available as a continecy elsewhere

In which case, no argument from me; units can have both a committed and a contingency role.

To put this another way: I don't believe that brigades that generate VJTF contingency forces should be committed to ongoing/routine security.
Whether that is 3Cdo, 16AAB, or even a putative 'light-strike' brigade composed of gurka and light-cav units, etc.
As I understand it the JEF can drawn on any or all of U.K. forces held at high readiness depending on what is required. Other nations can attach as and when required.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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Tempest414 wrote: 12 May 2023, 08:30 We will not have enough Type 26/ 45's to forward deploy them in Oz the Type 31 is the perfect ship for EoS larger , low crew & long legged with a helicopter
It is all about the clarify of the strategic objectives and the prioritisation of money and resources to meet them.

I will argue that “Patrolling EoS” is not a Strategic Objective - “low level engagement, training and diplomacy” and “the display and contribution of top tier war fighting capabilities to alliances to deter conflict and protect UK interests” are. A T31 is overkill and expensive for the first, and underwhelming/under equipped for the second.

The RN could have got a couple more T26s and another probably another 3 B2 Rivers for the price of the T31s. However, it’s too late and the best course now IMO would be to equip 3 properly for the North Atlantic / JEF and sale 2 to New Zealand.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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Repulse wrote: 12 May 2023, 15:39
Tempest414 wrote: 12 May 2023, 08:30 We will not have enough Type 26/ 45's to forward deploy them in Oz the Type 31 is the perfect ship for EoS larger , low crew & long legged with a helicopter
It is all about the clarify of the strategic objectives and the prioritisation of money and resources to meet them.

I will argue that “Patrolling EoS” is not a Strategic Objective - “low level engagement, training and diplomacy” and “the display and contribution of top tier war fighting capabilities to alliances to deter conflict and protect UK interests” are. A T31 is overkill and expensive for the first, and underwhelming/under equipped for the second.

The RN could have got a couple more T26s and another probably another 3 B2 Rivers for the price of the T31s. However, it’s too late and the best course now IMO would be to equip 3 properly for the North Atlantic / JEF and sale 2 to New Zealand.
It will depend how T-31 enters service as said I think it enter service with 24 CAMM and 8 x NSM and fitted with S2170 ATDS this could be upped to 48 CAMM and 16 NSM quite cheaply this to me is no different adding 16 NSM than having to fill type 26's 24 VLS's

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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Repulse wrote: 12 May 2023, 15:39
Tempest414 wrote: 12 May 2023, 08:30 We will not have enough Type 26/ 45's to forward deploy them in Oz the Type 31 is the perfect ship for EoS larger , low crew & long legged with a helicopter
It is all about the clarify of the strategic objectives and the prioritisation of money and resources to meet them.

I will argue that “Patrolling EoS” is not a Strategic Objective - “low level engagement, training and diplomacy” and “the display and contribution of top tier war fighting capabilities to alliances to deter conflict and protect UK interests” are. A T31 is overkill and expensive for the first, and underwhelming/under equipped for the second.

The RN could have got a couple more T26s and another probably another 3 B2 Rivers for the price of the T31s. However, it’s too late and the best course now IMO would be to equip 3 properly for the North Atlantic / JEF and sale 2 to New Zealand.
U.K. deployments in the Indian Ocean is to deter illegal activity, provided maritime security for the flow of trade and uphold international norms like freedom of navigation.

You can debate if that is a strategic objective to which funding should be allocated but it is what is currently asked. The only reason offshore patrol vessels are doing it is because most of the escort fleet is either in deep refit or unreliable.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by jedibeeftrix »

SW1 wrote: 12 May 2023, 14:46
jedibeeftrix wrote: 12 May 2023, 12:56 Re: "Britain’s contribution to the JEF includes personnel and equipment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force, with the maritime element headed up by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines."

What RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Is it a full Carrier/Amphibious taskgroup, or, is it closer to what I described above:
e.g. an RB2 committed to Oman, but available as a continecy resource to deploy into the pacific.
e.g. the gurkas committed to brunei, but available as a continecy elsewhere

In which case, no argument from me; units can have both a committed and a contingency role.

To put this another way: I don't believe that brigades that generate VJTF contingency forces should be committed to ongoing/routine security.
Whether that is 3Cdo, 16AAB, or even a putative 'light-strike' brigade composed of gurka and light-cav units, etc.
As I understand it the JEF can drawn on any or all of U.K. forces held at high readiness depending on what is required. Other nations can attach as and when required.
Great. Here we return to my distinction between committed forces and contingent forces:
Any security grouping that is important enough to justify military commitments ought to be able to call upon contingency forces at need.

But what RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Our committment to the IndoPac right now is a River B2 and a Gurkha battalion in Brunei.
But we hold other forces contingent as the situation requires, a Carrier/Amphib taskgroup as a for instance.
Is JEF similar?

My argument is that we should not double-hat committed forces to 'active' security provision.
i.e. a boxer-derived 'strike' brigade that is committed to NATO (JEF region), and yet is also earmarked for some putative treaty arrangement in asia.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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jedibeeftrix wrote: 13 May 2023, 10:48
SW1 wrote: 12 May 2023, 14:46
jedibeeftrix wrote: 12 May 2023, 12:56 Re: "Britain’s contribution to the JEF includes personnel and equipment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force, with the maritime element headed up by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines."

What RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Is it a full Carrier/Amphibious taskgroup, or, is it closer to what I described above:
e.g. an RB2 committed to Oman, but available as a continecy resource to deploy into the pacific.
e.g. the gurkas committed to brunei, but available as a continecy elsewhere

In which case, no argument from me; units can have both a committed and a contingency role.

To put this another way: I don't believe that brigades that generate VJTF contingency forces should be committed to ongoing/routine security.
Whether that is 3Cdo, 16AAB, or even a putative 'light-strike' brigade composed of gurka and light-cav units, etc.
As I understand it the JEF can drawn on any or all of U.K. forces held at high readiness depending on what is required. Other nations can attach as and when required.
Great. Here we return to my distinction between committed forces and contingent forces:
Any security grouping that is important enough to justify military commitments ought to be able to call upon contingency forces at need.

But what RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Our committment to the IndoPac right now is a River B2 and a Gurkha battalion in Brunei.
But we hold other forces contingent as the situation requires, a Carrier/Amphib taskgroup as a for instance.
Is JEF similar?

My argument is that we should not double-hat committed forces to 'active' security provision.
i.e. a boxer-derived 'strike' brigade that is committed to NATO (JEF region), and yet is also earmarked for some putative treaty arrangement in asia.
The joint expeditionary force is by definition a contingent capability to respond as required and hence draws on lead commando, airborne, armoured, aviation and maritime task groups as the situation requires which are if you like assigned to it. So yes you can’t have contingent capability if they are used somewhere.

There are what have historically been called standing tasks or garrison requirements that are what they are, yet you would define them as active security provision.

There is between this NATO high readiness force which we will be leading for the next couple of years and it has forces that cannot be committed to anything else but nato.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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jedibeeftrix wrote: 13 May 2023, 10:48
SW1 wrote: 12 May 2023, 14:46
jedibeeftrix wrote: 12 May 2023, 12:56 Re: "Britain’s contribution to the JEF includes personnel and equipment from the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, British Army and Royal Air Force, with the maritime element headed up by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines."

What RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Is it a full Carrier/Amphibious taskgroup, or, is it closer to what I described above:
e.g. an RB2 committed to Oman, but available as a continecy resource to deploy into the pacific.
e.g. the gurkas committed to brunei, but available as a continecy elsewhere

In which case, no argument from me; units can have both a committed and a contingency role.

To put this another way: I don't believe that brigades that generate VJTF contingency forces should be committed to ongoing/routine security.
Whether that is 3Cdo, 16AAB, or even a putative 'light-strike' brigade composed of gurka and light-cav units, etc.
As I understand it the JEF can drawn on any or all of U.K. forces held at high readiness depending on what is required. Other nations can attach as and when required.
Great. Here we return to my distinction between committed forces and contingent forces:
Any security grouping that is important enough to justify military commitments ought to be able to call upon contingency forces at need.

But what RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Our committment to the IndoPac right now is a River B2 and a Gurkha battalion in Brunei.
But we hold other forces contingent as the situation requires, a Carrier/Amphib taskgroup as a for instance.
Is JEF similar?

My argument is that we should not double-hat committed forces to 'active' security provision.
i.e. a boxer-derived 'strike' brigade that is committed to NATO (JEF region), and yet is also earmarked for some putative treaty arrangement in asia.
The way I see it right now is our full time commitment to EoS is 1 x Bay , 1 x Escort , 2 x River B2's , 3 x MCMV and 1 x Gurkha Battalion

As far as JEF goes the Commitment is 1 x LPD , 1 x Bay , 1 x Escort plus one other which maybe another Bay , Argus or a Point class
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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I can’t help but think that the MRSS program will go the way of the FSS, annually kicked another year out and then delayed even further with protracted contract discussions, ultimately then ending up with a fraction of what was originally planned. The world doesn’t wait, if a distributed forward based FCF is the right answer it needs to happen in the next five years not two decades.

I’ve been thinking about the original FLSS proposal from Prevail which had a lease option with commercial operation for a period. Maybe it’s time to look at this again.

Controversial, but how about the following amphibious force to be implemented with five years.

- 2 active Albion LPDs, with plans to replace them with something like the Ōsumi-class in the latter 2030s. One LPD (plus assigned Cdo) integrated with each CSG creating two globally deployable ESG groups based in the UK.

Image

- 3 Leased Littoral Strike Ships commercially operated, one based in the UK assigned to JEF, one based in Oman and another in Australia operating with the RAN. Each LSS would be assigned a Cdo Company.

Image

- A new commercially converted Ice Patrol Ship, with a Merlin capable hangar and accommodation for up to one RM Company. Primarily operating in the South Atlantic, but could also operate in the Artic.

Image

The three LSDs would be sold to pay for the additional Ice Patrol ship conversion and cash provided to the Army Logistical Corps to support the ability to transport army units more quickly.

It is affordable within the current budget and can alleviate crew pressures, especially in the RFA, meaning that perhaps the two Waves can come back into service.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by jedibeeftrix »

Tempest414 wrote: 13 May 2023, 11:22
jedibeeftrix wrote: 13 May 2023, 10:48
Great. Here we return to my distinction between committed forces and contingent forces:
Any security grouping that is important enough to justify military commitments ought to be able to call upon contingency forces at need.

But what RN/RM/BA/RAF forces are committed to the Joint Expeditionary Force (Maritime)?
On an ongoing basis.

Our committment to the IndoPac right now is a River B2 and a Gurkha battalion in Brunei.
But we hold other forces contingent as the situation requires, a Carrier/Amphib taskgroup as a for instance.
Is JEF similar?

My argument is that we should not double-hat committed forces to 'active' security provision.
i.e. a boxer-derived 'strike' brigade that is committed to NATO (JEF region), and yet is also earmarked for some putative treaty arrangement in asia.
The way I see it right now is our full time commitment to EoS is 1 x Bay , 1 x Escort , 2 x River B2's , 3 x MCMV and 1 x Gurkha Battalion

As far as JEF goes the Commitment is 1 x LPD , 1 x Bay , 1 x Escort plus one other which maybe another Bay , Argus or a Point class
So this is where it gets interesting, re: the commited/contingent forces.

Would it be fair to state that EoS could be deemed to be committed? I would say so.
It might be fair to say also that the depth of the relationship between the RM and Norway effectively made them a committed force too...

But with all the talk here that Sw/Fi joining Nato ends the RM role in the High North (with Norway, really), the conclusion this leads to is that: "the baltics is an army role from now on, the LSG(N) is dead, and 3Cdo better go find a new party to play in."

I'd say the UKForces role in the Nordics will now change, and it may well be that an army brigade is 'committed' to the 'active' security provision we agree to perform. However, this does not change the utility of 3Cdo is a contingent capability, that remains extremely well adapted to working in the Norwegian littoral.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by wargame_insomniac »

Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 12:03 I can’t help but think that the MRSS program will go the way of the FSS, annually kicked another year out and then delayed even further with protracted contract discussions, ultimately then ending up with a fraction of what was originally planned. The world doesn’t wait, if a distributed forward based FCF is the right answer it needs to happen in the next five years not two decades.

I’ve been thinking about the original FLSS proposal from Prevail which had a lease option with commercial operation for a period. Maybe it’s time to look at this again.

Controversial, but how about the following amphibious force to be implemented with five years.

- 2 active Albion LPDs, with plans to replace them with something like the Ōsumi-class in the latter 2030s. One LPD (plus assigned Cdo) integrated with each CSG creating two globally deployable ESG groups based in the UK.

Image

- 3 Leased Littoral Strike Ships commercially operated, one based in the UK assigned to JEF, one based in Oman and another in Australia operating with the RAN. Each LSS would be assigned a Cdo Company.

Image

- A new commercially converted Ice Patrol Ship, with a Merlin capable hangar and accommodation for up to one RM Company. Primarily operating in the South Atlantic, but could also operate in the Artic.

Image

The three LSDs would be sold to pay for the additional Ice Patrol ship conversion and cash provided to the Army Logistical Corps to support the ability to transport army units more quickly.

It is affordable within the current budget and can alleviate crew pressures, especially in the RFA, meaning that perhaps the two Waves can come back into service.
I like most of what you suggested. Apart from selling the 3 Bays - they seem incredibly useful and capable for their cost, and they are the most modern of the UK Amphibs. But I can't see how would pay for what you siggested if we did NOT sell the 3 Bays.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

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Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 12:03 The three LSDs would be sold….
Why?

What can a Prevail style LSS do better than a Bay LSS with a fixed hanger?

I don’t necessarily disagree with your overall proposal but selling Bays to lease converted Points seems nuts.

Please explain the rationale.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Repulse »

Poiuytrewq wrote: 13 May 2023, 21:25
Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 12:03 The three LSDs would be sold….
Why?

What can a Prevail style LSS do better than a Bay LSS with a fixed hanger?

I don’t necessarily disagree with your overall proposal but selling Bays to lease converted Points seems nuts.

Please explain the rationale.
Three reasons really:
- New requirement: the Bays were designed when the UK had the ambition to land a brigade, primarily as logistical / vehicle transports (replacements for the Round Table LSLs) operating alongside a LPH and LPD. We aren’t landing a Brigade anywhere over the beach and operating these large ships close to shore is liability. The FLSSs would be capable of operating as (albeit smaller) a self contained unit with significant airlift capability out of the box.
- Money: They need to be replaced, there is no money. Upgrades and new ships will be talked about for years with no outcome. The deal with the Prevail was effectively a PFI.
- Crew: Having them crewed outside of the RN/RFA reduces the pressure allowing the fleet to actually grow.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by wargame_insomniac »

Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 22:33
Poiuytrewq wrote: 13 May 2023, 21:25
Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 12:03 The three LSDs would be sold….
Why?

What can a Prevail style LSS do better than a Bay LSS with a fixed hanger?

I don’t necessarily disagree with your overall proposal but selling Bays to lease converted Points seems nuts.

Please explain the rationale.
Three reasons really:
- New requirement: the Bays were designed when the UK had the ambition to land a brigade, primarily as logistical / vehicle transports (replacements for the Round Table LSLs) operating alongside a LPH and LPD. We aren’t landing a Brigade anywhere over the beach and operating these large ships close to shore is liability. The FLSSs would be capable of operating as (albeit smaller) a self contained unit with significant airlift capability out of the box.
- Money: They need to be replaced, there is no money. Upgrades and new ships will be talked about for years with no outcome. The deal with the Prevail was effectively a PFI.
- Crew: Having them crewed outside of the RN/RFA reduces the pressure allowing the fleet to actually grow.
I cam understand the desire to improve RFA staffing, epecially with new MROSS (RFA Proteus) and MCMV (RFA Stirling Castle) being operational in 2023 and the 3*FSS being built..

How about a sale and leaseback of the 3 Bays with Prevail or another company that can provide commercial crew? It just feels wrong to ditch the 3 newest of the UK's amphibs.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Repulse »

wargame_insomniac wrote: 13 May 2023, 23:04 How about a sale and leaseback of the 3 Bays with Prevail or another company that can provide commercial crew? It just feels wrong to ditch the 3 newest of the UK's amphibs.
Interesting option, but only if part of the funds from the sale would then be used for significant modifications to the ships. However, they were designed primarily as Logistical Ships as part of a larger ARG, they will never be as good as ships that have been designs with the Littoral Strike Ship requirements in mind.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Poiuytrewq »

Repulse wrote: 13 May 2023, 22:33
- New requirement: the Bays were designed when the UK had the ambition to land a brigade, primarily as logistical / vehicle transports (replacements for the Round Table LSLs) operating alongside a LPH and LPD. We aren’t landing a Brigade anywhere over the beach and operating these large ships close to shore is liability. The FLSSs would be capable of operating as (albeit smaller) a self contained unit with significant airlift capability out of the box.
The main driver behind the FLSS was to save money by building or converting ships outside of the UK due to the hands off approach. It was a cost cutting exercise to offset the deletion of the LPDs.

With a fixed hanger the Bays are superior in virtually every regard when compared to a Prevail LSS.

Where is the advantage?

- Money: They need to be replaced, there is no money. Upgrades and new ships will be talked about for years with no outcome. The deal with the Prevail was effectively a PFI.
Why the hurry?

Properly converted to operate the FCF in the most optimal way the OSD for the Albions, Bays and Waves could be pushed out to 2040 to 2045 for the cost of a single T31. With money tight it is the obvious thing to do.
- Crew: Having them crewed outside of the RN/RFA reduces the pressure allowing the fleet to actually grow.
Why not just invest in recruitment and retention within the RFA rather than trying to privatise the UKs Amphibious fleet?

What other navy in the world is operating a similar privatised setup?
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Repulse »

Poiuytrewq wrote: 14 May 2023, 11:46 With a fixed hanger the Bays are superior in virtually every regard when compared to a Prevail LSS.
There is no money. The RN has soldiered on with Argus for a reason, money was definitely one and possibly also because the Bays aren’t suitable for conversion. Even then you’d get one with a hangar max, it will be too limited.

It may be superior for transporting tanks and supplies for a brigade but that is not a requirement.
Poiuytrewq wrote: 14 May 2023, 11:46 Where is the advantage?
You get not one but three platforms that meet the requirement - a flexible RM operating platform for a company level operation (with ability to surge two companies) with ability to operate significant helicopter lift independently. You get that in the next five years, not two decades.

What’s more with two FLSS EoS with large hangars then there is even less reason to waste money forward basing T31s.
Poiuytrewq wrote: 14 May 2023, 11:46 What other navy in the world is operating a similar privatised setup?
If the RN took that attitude, how many common place practices wouldn’t be in place now? The RN should do what’s right for it rather than worrying about copying others.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Poiuytrewq »

Repulse wrote: 14 May 2023, 12:30 There is no money.
There is plenty of money, it’s just a question of where the MoD chooses to spend it.
The RN has soldiered on with Argus for a reason, money was definitely one and possibly also because the Bays aren’t suitable for conversion. Even then you’d get one with a hangar max, it will be too limited.
The Amphib fleet has been gutted to ensure PWLS was commissioned. With a change of government PWLS could be mothballed to solve the headcount issue and any new PFI deals will be extremely unlikely. Much more likely that more ships will be built or converted and the Tilt EoS will unwind.

RN may want to wait to see the outcome of the election or bash on and get things moving beforehand. IMO it is the most sensible to bash on with the Bay and Wave conversions as HADR vessels with a credible self sustaining LSS capability when combined. It’s time for RN to hedge.

There is no reason at all that the Bays could not be given a Rotterdam type capability.
It may be superior for transporting tanks and supplies for a brigade but that is not a requirement.
What is the requirement? A converted Bay is superior in virtually every way.
You get not one but three platforms that meet the requirement - a flexible RM operating platform for a company level operation (with ability to surge two companies) with ability to operate significant helicopter lift independently. You get that in the next five years, not two decades.
If you converted the Bays you could have it in 18 months.
What’s more with two FLSS EoS with large hangars then there is even less reason to waste money forward basing T31s.
Like it or not the T31s are coming! It won’t change now. It’s happening.
If the RN took that attitude, how many common place practices wouldn’t be in place now? The RN should do what’s right for it rather than worrying about copying others.
The reason no other navy in the world consider asking a private company to operate their assault ships is because it is a bad idea.

How much would this PFI arrangement cost?

The fleet is now tiny and it must not get any smaller. Putting the next gen Amphibs on the credit card is not a solution. Selling ships with half of their hull life remaining is bonkers. Look at Largs Bay and Ocean.

The answer is not ever more classes of ships.

The answer is cutting the cloth according the budget envelope and making the most of what is in the water right now today.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Poiuytrewq »

Moved across:
topman wrote: 27 May 2023, 16:03 I don't think the government wants a global force
The Integrated Review is all about making the Army a more globally deployed force so it’s difficult to agree. It is clear however that HMT is not currently prepared to pay for it.
….nor the slightest intention of paying for a large increase in numbers.
In terms of the Royal Marines, 3Cdo is a massively capable formation. From a RN perspective it is more than big enough to facilitate the LRG/LSG/ESF strategy.

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by SW1 »

Poiuytrewq wrote: 27 May 2023, 17:16 Moved across:
topman wrote: 27 May 2023, 16:03 I don't think the government wants a global force
The Integrated Review is all about making the Army a more globally deployed force so it’s difficult to agree. It is clear however that HMT is not currently prepared to pay for it.
….nor the slightest intention of paying for a large increase in numbers.
In terms of the Royal Marines, 3Cdo is a massively capable formation. From a RN perspective it is more than big enough to facilitate the LRG/LSG/ESF strategy.
I’m really not sure the review did make it a more global deployed force to be honest. It would have needed a much bigger bias to enabling forces to do that and it did the opposite.


The RN have deliberately sacrificed 3 commando on the carrier alter and tbh I’ve seen nothing that suggests a reversal in this strategy.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by mrclark303 »

SW1 wrote: 27 May 2023, 19:30
Poiuytrewq wrote: 27 May 2023, 17:16 Moved across:
topman wrote: 27 May 2023, 16:03 I don't think the government wants a global force
The Integrated Review is all about making the Army a more globally deployed force so it’s difficult to agree. It is clear however that HMT is not currently prepared to pay for it.
….nor the slightest intention of paying for a large increase in numbers.
In terms of the Royal Marines, 3Cdo is a massively capable formation. From a RN perspective it is more than big enough to facilitate the LRG/LSG/ESF strategy.
I’m really not sure the review did make it a more global deployed force to be honest. It would have needed a much bigger bias to enabling forces to do that and it did the opposite.


The RN have deliberately sacrificed 3 commando on the carrier alter and tbh I’ve seen nothing that suggests a reversal in this strategy.
I have to agree, we have effectively destroyed Commando Brigade capability, the Commando Raider philosophy is fine, I have no issues with it, but the Royal Marines should have been expanded by a Commando (up to 8,500), with Brigade level operations fully supported and a single Commando dedicated to to the Raider concept.

As it is, it's effectively cuts with a PR spin....
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Scimitar54 »

mrclark303 wrote:-
the Commando Raider philosophy is fine, I have no issues with it, but the Royal Marines should have been expanded by a Commando (up to 8,500), with Brigade level operations fully supported and a single Commando dedicated to to the Raider concept.
I too, would have liked to have seen the size of the RM increased by the establishment of an additional Commando that would be dedicated to the Raider Concept. However against a background of sizeable headcount reductions across the armed forces and the RN being forced to choose between RN Ship crewing and RM personnel, what has happened is understandable.

HMG should never have placed the RN (in this particular case) into such an impossible and desperate situation. Once again the lack of sufficient funding was the result of foolish political expediency. :crazy:
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Tempest414 »

I think right now the RN / RM are looking to hold a Battalion battle group at high readiness with the ability to pull a light Brigade together with

30 commando
40 & 45 commando
47 Commando
Commando Logistics Regt
28 & 29 Army Commando Engineer and Artillery
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Repulse »

Sorry, but we are stuck in the past. Having a RM Brigade is absolutely pointless unless you have air superiority and ships capable to get them landed safely, what’s more the proliferation of A2AD capabilities has made this significantly more difficult. The mindset seems to be that that’s not important, so effectively this means that it’s ok for the RMs to be seen as a land force used to compliment the Army as it did in Helmand.

Equally let’s just image magical funds did appear to give both carrier strike and a Brigade level RM amphibious ops, it’s all pointless unless the Army is able to transport its troops and kit to follow-up. It isn’t going to happen without a significant increase in the defence budget, nor is nation building/large scale expeditionary ops going to be on the political agenda for a few decades if ever.

Let’s move on shall we
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston

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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by SW1 »

I think you’re missing the point of what the commandos would be used for. It isn’t about nation building. Not necessarily large scale expeditionary operations either though if you’re not doing large expeditionary operations why are you building an a/c carrier it’s there only use.

The use of marines would largely be very similar to their role in the Cold War or indeed how the US marines littoral regiments plan to operate. Namely to deploy quickly to reinforce friendly allies to deny hostile forces access to sea lanes or naval infrastructure. Buying time for an army brigade to deploy and reinforce. The marines would be creating a A2AD in the littoral off allied states for the enemy to penetrate not the other way round.
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Re: Current & Future Amphibious Capability - General Discussion

Post by Repulse »

The role you are describing has some merit - but:
- It’s equally, if not more so, a role for the Army
- There is no need for large amphibious assault ships is that is the purpose - logistics plus troops via the RAF
- For the RMs contribution where speed would be of the essence, OTH helicopter transport + logistics from one of more FSS is probably a good solution.

None of this justifies a RM Brigade of the past as most see it here.
”We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." - Lord Palmerston

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