Integrated Review (previously SDSR 2020)

[serge750]

Might be a good thing, maybe priorities will change, all depends on how the UK recovers...

[Lord Jim]

The extra time should be put to good use consulting as may sources as passible even during this crisis. Many experts strongly believe that a revive should take at least twelve months if not longer, and tying it into the CSR places too many limits on it.

A lot is going to depend on the state of the country after we emerge on the other side. I do not think we will have another SDSR 2010 debacle but some hard choices are going to have to be made as to what is going to be our place in the world, what capabilities do we need to concentrate on as a result. I strongly believe the days of the UK trying to have a full range of top tier capabilities are over, as is the illusion successive Governments have tried to maintain that we actually have them.

[ArmChairCivvy]

A lot is going to depend on the state of the country after we emerge on the other side. I do not think we will have another SDSR 2010 debacle

Was the savings target 10% for all departments then; not sure, that was a 'while' back. Anyway @paulkrugman, Nobel laureate, estimates that for the US the downturn this time will be 3-5 worse and IMF has obliged and calculated the central estimate for some larger states in Europe:
in its brand new Outlook "The IMF predicted that the UK economy would see its economy contract by 6.5% this year - the biggest slump since 1921.Other European countries would experience similar contractions, with Italy shrinking by 9.1% and Spain by 8%."

As LJ points out, the 2010 exercise was badly done, so whatever the percentage (as a target) hopefully a more reasoned process will be followed. My gazing at a crystal says
- The RN and the RAF are told to carry on as usual for a year (their projects being capital intensive and long term0
- unit amalgamations in the army will be speeded up so as to make the situation better reflects the large-ish recruitment shortfall... even though that aspect might see a self correction and the unfilled billets are 'money saved' as it stands

[Repulse]

SDSR delayed by as much as a year.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/euro ... ronavirus/

Problem is that cash was already an issue to fund current plans so we may end up with some very damaging short term decisions.

Also:

“What we have and what we would like are going to be colored by a budget settlement smaller than people were anticipating; in fact, quite substantially smaller. Whether that means the MoD starts to think about reprofiling things to the right or really starts taking strategic choices, we will have to wait and see,” added Louth, who until recently was a senior analyst at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London.

Assuming the UK still wants to be a “Global Player” (but definitely not a Global Power), I think HMG needs to be brave and make some hard strategic decisions quickly or the cuts will be deeper.

It has to be in the order of:
- Cancel Dreadnought and Trident replacement: move to distributed SSN, air and sea tactical nukes.
- Remove the dream of being able to deploy an Army division globally: Brigade level capability only based on STRIKE or its replacement.
- Stop at 48 F35Bs: Focus all 48 on CEPP, and extend the life of the Tiffies until Tempest.

[mr.fred]

It has to be in the order of:
- Cancel Dreadnought and Trident replacement: move to distributed SSN, air and sea tactical nukes.

Move away from the nuclear option entirely in that case. Air and sea-basing is not a credible deterrent.

[Repulse]

Move away from the nuclear option entirely in that case. Air and sea-basing is not a credible deterrent.

It definitely would not be “I will destroy you and you families” Trident CASD level no, more of an Israeli “I can give you a bloody nose if you try and mess”. I personally cannot see the Trident level response being used, and our adversaries know that so will never get to a point where it would be justified. Tactical nukes are more uncertain as it gives a more limited response targeted more towards military threats.

[mr.fred]

Move away from the nuclear option entirely in that case. Air and sea-basing is not a credible deterrent.

It definitely would not be “I will destroy you and you families” Trident CASD level no, more of an Israeli “I can give you a bloody nose if you try and mess”. I personally cannot see the Trident level response being used, and our adversaries know that so will never get to a point where it would be justified. Tactical nukes are more uncertain as it gives a more limited response targeted more towards military threats.

You make it more likely to be used, not less. This is a bad thing.
The air/sea tactical half measures says “we might be able to give you a bloody nose, assuming that you don’t get our systems first and that you have anything you care about in range” whereas the CASD say “we will hit something you care about and there is very little you can do about that”

The system the Israelis have works for them because the people they wish to deter have what they care about within range of the air/sea tactical systems and insufficient ability to guarantee that the Israelis won’t get through.

[abc123]

and our adversaries know that so will never get to a point where it would be justified. .

And mission of strategic deterrence is fulfilled.

[Lord Jim]

Which is why it is a political tool and not a military one and should not be funded from the Mod Procurement budget or even its operating cost to be fair.

[Repulse]

And mission of strategic deterrence is fulfilled.

You completely miss my point, full out immediate nuclear war will only happen by accident; in real life it will be a ratcheting up of tension/conflict. The UK is quickly getting to the point where it will have limited capability outside of CASD to respond to conflict to a peer or superpower foe. Money that could be spent on earlier/de-escalating capabilities are no longer there.

I apologise for the analogy, as I couldn’t think of a better one, but CASD/Trident is a suicide belt - the likely outcome is that everyone will die/be significantly hurt. Even if it wasn’t, it would be a very brave PM (or any foreign leader) which would be prepared to cause million of civilian deaths. Everyone knows this, including Russian and China.

So where is the trigger point?
- Invasion of Ukraine?
- Annexation of Syria?
- Removal of other countries by China in the South China Sea?
- Invasion of South Korea?
- Harassing of allied ships in the Med / Atlantic?
- Support of Terrorist organisations conducting attacks in Eastern Europe?
- Support of Terrorist organisations conducting attacks in the U.K.?
- Sinking of a British Warship or shooting down a CAP Tiffies?
- Assassination of the Queen?
- Blockade of UK ports?
- Invasion of the Baltic's?
- Invasion of Norway?
- Invasion of Iceland?
- Invasion of the Shetlands?
- Invasion of Scotland?
- Invasion of England?
- Troops marching down Whitehall?

Now answer the same question if we had larger conventional forces and tactical nukes where impact can better limited to stage of conflict.

[mr.fred]

Now answer the same question if we had larger conventional forces and tactical nukes where impact can better limited to stage of conflict.

Then we have no strategic deterrent. The use of nuclear weapons is most likely to be in response to the use of nuclear weapons. We use atomics then so can (will) the other side. We have nothing further to dissuade them from using strategic weapons.
With the strategic deterrent we retain the ability to use a limited strike if we think that it can be limited to a particular sphere of operations, such as a situation where the opposition cannot strike back at us*. But we still retain the strategic deterrent.

So where is the trigger point?

Consider the same question for your proposal. At which point do you start using atomics?
What happens when you opponent says “ouch. Do that again and we’ll start targeting your cities” or just straight up resorts to targeting our cities in response?

*such as a situation where a nuclear power has decided to limit itself to limited tactical weapons.

[ArmChairCivvy]

situation where the opposition cannot strike back at us*

*such as a situation where a nuclear power has decided to limit itself to limited tactical weapons.

other options being stand-still/pull-back

The literature, once upon a time, on brinkmanship grew to be vast. Of course the preceding stage to actually launching any nuke is nuclear signalling: I think I put upstream an inventory of the most serious incidents in that respect
- the lesson was that the most serious one was simply an erraneous reading (and strangely enough the malfunctioning of the Soviet early warning system, reporting a massive attack, had not made it into the inventory... anyway the first one a physical device and the second the usual culprit: software)

[Repulse]

mr.fred, the Strategic Deterrent has always targeted towards stopping people using their deterrent because of Mutually Assured Destruction. However, in the real world, would China want to nuke everyone in the USA or the UK for that matter? Answer, is clearly a no as it would cause an economic shock which would make the COVID impact look like bank holiday closing. Russia the same. This does not stop them from wanting to get Strategic advantage or control of resources and territory. As I and ArmChairCivvy have stated, the most likely cause of them being used by far is by error.

Consider the same question for your proposal. At which point do you start using atomics?

At the point of invasion by mass forces, using the appropriate warhead size against aggressive armed formations, or C&C / supporting functions. It would be measured and appropriate.

Would I expect the enemy to respond in a similar manner - yes, in fact our enemies already have these weapons and would probably be prepared to use them first, which is why the UK should be investing more into BMD and the like.

Do I for one moment believe the UK would use its Strategic Deterrent in response to a tactical nuclear weapon being used on its forces - not a chance.

[mr.fred]

Do I for one moment believe the UK would use its Strategic Deterrent in response to a tactical nuclear weapon being used on its forces - not a chance.

But it’s not about what the UK would do, is it?

If the UK uses a limited nuclear option tactically*, what’s to stop an opponent using theirs strategically?
*which, by your ruling suggests very close range to our civilians, so the opposition is going to be in range with their kit and, unless it’s the French, Germans or Dutch, we’re not going to be able to respond.
*

[ArmChairCivvy]

The above a good intro to what I wanted to say, now it will fit into the narrative better:

"There is at least the possibility, however, that conventionally armed precision strikes could replace weapons of mass destruction with weapons of mass effectiveness. A major war could do some much damage to the economies of both sides that it would be the economic equivalent of “mutual assured destruction.” If so, as long as all sides control their level of escalation to the levels that best suit their strategic advantage, they will avoid major exchanges of this kind and continue to focus on wars of influence"

This is no joking matter, but the old saying about "What's a tactical nuclear weapon?" and the answer "One that goes off on German soil" comes to mind.

However the quote is from a report lead authored by Anthony Cordesman for CSIS about the wider-Gulf Region. Similar things have been written by the Swedish Research Institute on War (though a more outright analysis is on one of the interview videos that I have linked to - only Heaven knows on which thread.
- the point is that e.g. Iskander has been developed into a semi-ballistic weapon, so from the initial trajectory one cannot analyse where the hit will be - nor whether that impact, or the other possible ones are covered by credible defences (in the Swedish case the Patriots, for which they upped the number of planned batteries).

[Repulse]

Do I for one moment believe the UK would use its Strategic Deterrent in response to a tactical nuclear weapon being used on its forces - not a chance.

But it’s not about what the UK would do, is it?

If the UK uses a limited nuclear option tactically*, what’s to stop an opponent using theirs strategically?
*which, by your ruling suggests very close range to our civilians, so the opposition is going to be in range with their kit and, unless it’s the French, Germans or Dutch, we’re not going to be able to respond.
*

No it doesn’t. With a credible UK (and allied for that matter) conventional force, any invasion force would need to be very large with significant supply and C&C requirements. Tactical nukes fired at an invading armada, or supply ports and key installations on enemies territory would stop or severely hamper any invading force.

[mr.fred]

With a credible UK (and allied for that matter) conventional force, any invasion force would need to be very large with significant supply and C&C requirements. Tactical nukes fired at an invading armada, or supply ports and key installations on enemies territory would stop or severely hamper any invading force.

Or simply give them an excuse to fire back in kind, at which point you’re in range of their key force and it’s much more likely that they’re in range too.
You could refer to Blackadder’s summation of the deterrent effect of large conventional forces as well.

[mr.fred]

No it doesn’t

No what doesn’t?

[Repulse]

your ruling suggests very close range to our civilians

“...your ruling suggests very close range to our civilians...”

You could refer to Blackadder’s summation of the deterrent effect of large conventional forces as well.

Not suggesting large, more capable and in places (like SSNs and Frigates) slightly more. CASD drains funds that can and should be spent on other capabilities that will be used.

Or simply give them an excuse to fire back in kind

I don’t think they will be looking for an excuse to neutralise UK military capabilities.

[mr.fred]

I don’t think they will be looking for an excuse to neutralise UK military capabilities.

At that point the military capabilities they’ll be hitting will be adjacent to population centres.

[Repulse]

At that point the military capabilities they’ll be hitting will be adjacent to population centres.

The point is they already have these weapons, dockyards, barracks, airfields and comms/political centres will be targets today. We need to invest in BMD and A2/AD also.

[mr.fred]

At that point the military capabilities they’ll be hitting will be adjacent to population centres.

The point is they already have these weapons, dockyards, barracks, airfields and comms/political centres will be targets today. We need to invest in BMD and A2/AD also.

The difference being that today we have a strategic deterrent that would make it extremely costly to target them.

[Repulse]

he difference being that today we have a strategic deterrent that would make it extremely costly to target them.

That we will not use, and they know it.

[mr.fred]

Do they?
Won’t we?
Someone drops an atomic weapon on one of our cities and we would not retaliate?

Why have armed forces at all, in that instance?

[abc123]

Now answer the same question if we had larger conventional forces and tactical nukes where impact can better limited to stage of conflict.

Then we have no strategic deterrent. The use of nuclear weapons is most likely to be in response to the use of nuclear weapons. We use atomics then so can (will) the other side. We have nothing further to dissuade them from using strategic weapons.
With the strategic deterrent we retain the ability to use a limited strike if we think that it can be limited to a particular sphere of operations, such as a situation where the opposition cannot strike back at us*. But we still retain the strategic deterrent.

So where is the trigger point?

Consider the same question for your proposal. At which point do you start using atomics?
What happens when you opponent says “ouch. Do that again and we’ll start targeting your cities” or just straight up resorts to targeting our cities in response?

*such as a situation where a nuclear power has decided to limit itself to limited tactical weapons.